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This is a paper about legal pedagogy. Although content and meth-
odology are often difficult to separate, what I have to say has more to do
with process than with substance. It is not complicated, but it is in-
tended to be provocative as well as illustrative. The basic premise is that
virtually any subject area can provide fertile ground for teaching the
skills, principles, and theories of responsible law practice from which law
teachers have to choose in designing their courses. The subject of
Shakespeare, for both practical and philosophical reasons, serves here as
the example by which this premise is demonstrated.
In putting this piece together, I was guided by two underlying prin-
ciples. Neither is revolutionary, but together they help explain the con-
clusions I have drawn and the decisions I make about teaching. The first
principle has to do with metaphors and the interrelationships between
ideas. Law can be seen as a metaphor for life, and life, I suppose, can be
seen as a metaphor for the practice of law.' Anything, in fact, can be
seen as a metaphor for anything else. Any process can be analogized to
any other, and in the final analysis, all things are related to all others. It
is simply a matter of seeing the connections. Thus I can say to my stu-
dents, a good brief is like an award-winning Japanese garden; it must be
planned and laid out with excruciating care to insure that the results
achieved appear to be the inevitable and untampered-with design of na-
ture. Or, I might postulate, the attorney at the negotiating table is a
Babel fish;2 the attorney's job is to decode both the client's and the
* The author owes thanks to Susan, Bob, Ann, Nancy, and Elliott, who not only
tolerate their colleagues' experiments in education, but encourage them; to Mary,
Heather, Lori and Michael for all their hard work; and of course to Peter andJamie, whose
brilliant scholarship and stellar courtroom performances were the inspiration.
1. The same idea has been expressed by James De Young, speaking on the subject of
experiential learning in the field of theatre arts:
Since the main goal in theatre practicums is cooperative achievement of the best
production possible and since every step along the way in a production involves a
new problem or new decision, it would appear that we have in place an ideal
model for life training as well as artistic training.
J. De Young, The Practicum Experience, Relic of the Sixties or Hope of the Eighties 3
(1985) (paper prepared for U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Educa-
tion, Educational Resources Information Center).
2. "The Babel fish," said the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy quietly,
is small, yellow and leechlike, and probably the oddest thing in the Universe. It
feeds on brainwave energy received not from its own carrier but from those
around it. It absorbs all unconscious mental frequencies from this brainwave en-
ergy to nourish itself with. It then excretes into the mind of its carrier a telepathic
matrix formed by combining the conscious thought frequencies with nerve sig-
nals picked up from the speech centers of the brain which has supplied them. The
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
adversary's language and communicate the thoughts of each to the
other. Such analogies, discussed and developed in the classroom, help
bridge the perceived chasm between the world of lay experiences and
the world of law practice. Students are thus able to learn something
about lawyering.
It is no doubt true that not all things are easily related to the prac-
tice of law, nor are all analogies equally appropriate. I would not, for
example, necessarily teach Japanese gardening as a prelude to teaching
about brief writing. Then again, I would not rule out the possibility
either. The point is, I could use Japanese gardening theory to teach
about brief writing, and do it successfully. Sufficient similarities exist in
the two activities to make an extended metaphor or analogy workable in
the classroom. This is true of a great many processes.
The second point I'd like to make is that we do best what we love.
When Bill Moyers asked Joseph Campbell during one of their interviews
on the critically-acclaimed Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth (inter-
views reprinted in J. CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF M=T (1988)), what ad-
vice he would give to one attempting to find meaning in this mythless
and ritualless time, Campbell replied, "follow your bliss." Law, teach-
ing, the teaching of law, and the practice of law may be blissful activities
in and of themselves, but most of us have broader interests. We like to
scale mountains or bake, steep ourselves in political debates or bury
ourselves in classical languages. These interests are important to us and
there is no reason why we have to leave our interests or those interesting
parts of ourselves outside the classroom door. The metaphorical
method is one way of making the things we love best an integral part of
our teaching.
One thing that makes it possible for law teachers to bring outside
interests into the classroom is the fact that the range of things that prac-
ticing lawyers need to know and understand is so vast as to be almost
overwhelming. We have the luxury-or the impossible task-of picking
and choosing among any number of important subject areas and ways of
teaching. This gives us broad latitude in discovering ways to fit into the
curriculum matters of interest to ourselves without straining to find ways
in which these interests are relevant to lawyering.
This is not, however, a call to omit a class on cross-examination in
favor of a class on bird watching. Nor do I mean to suggest that law
teachers should abandon basic instruction in essential areas. I simply
point out that what is "essential" consists of a great many things, and
that the number of ways of prioritizing what should be taught and how is
infinite. It is possible-perhaps even essential-to incorporate what we
practical upshot of all this is that if you stick a Babel fish in your ear you can
instantly understand anything said to you in any form of language. The speech
patterns you actually hear decode the brainwave matrix which has been fed into
your mind by your Babel fish.
D. ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 59 (1979). I am indebted to my
friends George LaRoche and Edith Blackwell for introducing me to the Babel fish.
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teachers, as human beings, have learned and loved outside the class-
room into our course syllabi.
There is also, I believe, a sound pedagogical basis for doing this.
Imagine a lawyer sitting back after dinner doing the New York Times
crossword puzzle. She is suddenly struck by the idea that the stories told
by plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses in court that day, cross and fit
together in the same way as the downs and acrosses of the Times' puzzle.
That lawyer has the beginnings of a closing argument. Such is the way
arguments and theories of a case are born. The ability to idly reflect on
processes and things and to make associations with other processes and
things is itself a skill, a skill that can be learned through observation and
practice. When law teachers practice that skill in the classroom, it en-
hances, rather than sacrifices, pedagogical objectives.
3
To demonstrate how these ideas can be put into practice, I have
selected two sample classes from an appellate advocacy seminar in which
the main theme is the writings of Shakespeare. The classes were in-
spired by a debate over the question of the true authorship of Shake-
speare's works. The format of the debate-an argument before an
appellate court-made it easy to see the connections that might be
drawn between Shakespearian scholarship and lawyering, and provided
some familiar means by which the classes could be taught.
Part I of this Article provides basic historical background to the sub-
ject of legal pedagogy, and particularly to the rise of the clinical method.
Part II identifies the existing problems law teachers face in deciding on
course content for skills-related courses and describes a few of the
choices others have made or advocated. Part III discusses my personal
approach to course design. Part IV examines the multiple ways in which
the subject of Shakespeare could be used to accomplish the objectives.
The ultimate choices made and justifications for these objectives are de-
tailed in Part V.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the late 19th century, when the scientific method was enjoying its
heyday, Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced into the law school
curriculum a pedagogical theory which he believed applied principles of
scientific analysis to legal thought.4 The legal system envisioned by
Langdell was one in which the ultimate discovery of a "few fundamental
principles" would inevitably lead to a legal practice governed by these
fundamentals. Legal judgments would be made by applying the few
legal principles written into the common law to facts, and legal judg-
ments accordingly would be dictated by "rationally compelling rea-
son."5 Despite the continuing efforts of legal theorists who have
3. It makes the learning process less painful for the students. "When we our betters
see bearing our woes,/ we scarcely think our miseries our foes." W. SHAKESPEARE, King
Lear, act 3, sc. 6, lines 102-103.
4. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
5. Id. at 8.
1991]
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pointed out the many flaws in Langdell's orthodoxy,6 Langdell's theo-
ries retain much of their vitality in today's law schools. The notion that
decisions are made by judges pursuant to some rational ordering of
known constructs still predominates, and the belief that such a process
of analysis can best be understood by examining the cases in which it is
done is still operative through the case book method of teaching law.
7
Even as the law schools clung (and continue to cling) to the scien-
tific method as adapted by Langdell, the legal profession has continu-
ously registered its complaints about the inability of new lawyers to
handle real cases as well as about the failures of the legal education sys-
tem to prepare students to practice law.8 Recent years have seen a vast
increase in the number of skills training programs for lawyers. 9 This
trend must be attributed in part to the profession's concern that lawyers
are not acquiring training in law school which is adequate to meet pro-
fessional practice norms.1 0
Although legal education has been slow to respond to the needs of
the profession, some development along these lines has taken place dur-
ing the last twenty years. Perhaps the most significant development has
been in the area of clinical legal education." 1 Without engaging in, and
certainly without resolving, any debates about what the definition of
6. This includes the futility of achieving anything like the formalistic utopia he pre-
dicted in a system governed by humans preferring to apply their own subjective rules
rather than the ostensibly objective ones of Langdell's ideal world. See, e.g., Bok, A Flawed
System of Lau, Practice and Training, 33J. Legal Educ. 570 (1983); Cramton, Lawyer Competence
and the Law Schools, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ. 1 (1981); Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-
School? 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933); Gee &Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and
Lawyer Competency, 4 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 695 (1977); Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduc-
tion of Hierarchy, 32J. Legal Educ. 591 (1982); N. Redlich, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE
METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS (1914).
7. GREY, supra note 4, at 50.
8. See e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982); Devitt & Roland,
Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Lawsuits? 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 445
(1987). Macauley, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two Recent
Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32J. LEGAL EDUC. 506 (1982); Martineau, Appellate Litigation Skills
Training: The Role of the Law Schools, 54 CINN. L. REV. 129 (1985); McEachern, The Trial
Process, 40 THE ADVOCATE 217 (1982).
9. In addition to the training opportunities offered by private firms, state and local
bar associations and such organizations as the National Institute for Trial Advocacy, law-
yers in some states are now required to participate in some form of practice-oriented con-
tinuing legal education. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 602, app. A (Supp. 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1-B (Supp. 1991); S.D. COD. LAws §§ 16-8-2 (1987).
10. The American Bar Association's standards on accreditation of law schools have
thus far not been interpreted to require law schools to make lawyering skills courses
mandatory for their students. See Standardsfor Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302 (1987).
Despite increasing pressure from bench and bar, such courses are still offered primarily as
electives; indeed, practical skills courses constitute a small percentage of the total number
of courses offered at most law schools. See Devitt & Roland, supra note 8, at 459. Devitt
and Roland point out that studies commissioned by federal judges and by the ABA have
identified significant advocacy deficiencies, which they attribute in part to the interpreta-
tion of Standard 302. Supra note 8 at 445, 459.
11. This development is tracked in Meltsner & Shrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1976). See also Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagno-
sis, 26J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974); Meltsner & Shrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1978).
[Vol. 68:3
1991] SHAKESPEARE COMES TO THE CLASSROOM 391
"clinical legal education" is12 or what the purposes of clinical education
are,13 I think it is safe to say that clinical education is, in part, a response
to the perceived failures of the educational system. Clinical teachers are
engaged in a search for ways to prepare students for the responsibilities
and realities of law practice.14
Thus, in clinical circles, the underlying assumption of Langdell or-
thodoxy-that we need to teach students to think like lawyers-has been
undermined by identification of a need for students to learn how to act
like lawyers. 15 Dissatisfaction with the Langdell method and greater
emphasis on what lawyers do has led to experimentation and develop-
ment of new methods and theories. 16
12. One definition of clinical legal education that has been proposed is "a curriculum-
based learning experience, requiring students in role ... to take responsibility for the
resolution of a potentially dynamic problem." Boon, A Working Model for Clinical Legal Edu-
cation: Testing the Definition Against a Range of Examples, 21 L. Tchr. 172 (1987). Boon goes
on to describe five categories of clinical course design: work experience; applications of
new (computer) technology; observation exercises; simulation exercises; and gaming. Id.
13. It has been asserted that clinical legal education had a "specific political origin" in
the late 1960's and was intended to promote two experiential goals: the exposure of mid-
dle class professional students to the life of the poor and the exposure of those same
students to the hypocrisy of the bar. Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the
Law School Curriculum, 14 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1, 6 (1983). Another educator has argued
that clinical methodology differs from the Langdellian appellate casebook method only
insofar as clinical instructors collect directly experienced examples involving third parties
as their core teaching materials rather than vicariously or indirectly experienced two-di-
mensional examples from casebooks. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 67 (1979). Barnhizer then suggests that a
"unique" potential of clinical programs is in the area of teaching professional responsibil-
ity. Id. at 68.
The uncertainty about, or lack of consensus on, what the purposes of clinical educa-
tion are can be gleaned further from articles describing clinical program development at
various schools. E.g., Haydock, Clinical Legal Education: The Histoy and Development of a Law
Clinic, 9 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 101 (1984) (focusing on clinical education as a "learn-by-
doing" method); Oppenheimer, Boalt Hall's Employment Discrimination Clinic: A Model for
Law School/Government Cooperation in Integrating Substance and Practice, 7 INtws. REL. L. REv.
245 (1985); see also Adams, Tulane Students Must Undertake Pro Bono Work Before Graduation, 10
NAT'L L.J. 4 (1988) (illustrative of the view that community service is a primary goal of
student practice).
14. It is no small problem that clinical legal education, however it is defined and
whatever its purposes are purported to be, is still regarded by many as peripheral to law
school education. Among other things, the continued marginality of clinical education has
been attributed to its associations with feminine (in theJungian sense) concerns with peo-
ple, unstructured situations and feelings. Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground:
A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 272 (1984).
Tushnet argues that clinicians have themselves contributed to this marginality by taking a
defensive posture when clinical education's overall value and cost-effectiveness are
brought into question rather than taking the offensive and attacking traditional legal edu-
cation's methods and values. It is well beyond the scope of this article to examine the
reasons for whatever continuing resistance there is to the inclusion of clinical programs in
the law schools, but in defense of clinical educators, I think it should be pointed out that
many are, and have been, engaged in the process of refining definitions, analyzing pro-
grams and making recommendations for development, and are not simply expending ef-
forts justifying the existence of clinical programs. See, e.g., infra note 34 and accompanying
text.
15. See, e.g., Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NovA L.J. 723 (1986).
Motley critiques the law school examination tradition, and goes on to make recommenda-
tions for change based on experiential learning concepts.
16. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education -a 21st Century Perspective, 34J. LEGAL EDUC.
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II. CURRICULAR NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR LAW TEACHERS
As educators have moved from the rationalistic orientation of Lang-
dell orthodoxy to a more practice-focused orientation, considerable at-
tention has been paid to the tasks of lawyering. In this regard, much
effort has been expended on teaching students, particularly in clinical
programs, how to "do" such tasks.' 7 Implicit in this approach to clinical
teaching are some underlying assumptions about what lawyers do.
From the available literature, it may be widely assumed that what law-
yers do is interview and counsel clients, negotiate, develop case theo-
ries, engage in case planning, conduct direct and cross examinations of
witnesses, write pleadings and do discovery. No doubt many lawyers do
engage in these activities, but they engage in many other activities as
well. Even these identified tasks can be broken down further or rear-
ranged to create different categories of tasks for teaching purposes. The
fairly typical focus of clinical curricula on such skills as interviewing and
negotiation is by no means necessarily dictated by the needs of the legal
profession or the goals of clinical educators.18
Moreover, dissatisfaction with Langdellian orthodoxy has not led to
wholesale agreement or immediate satisfaction with the programs cre-
ated in part as alternatives. Interestingly enough, although the initial
creation of skills programs may be intimately related to a growing dissat-
isfaction with Langdellian orthodoxy, internal program development
has suffered from many of the very same problems as those which have
consistently plagued the legal education profession and which contrib-
uted to the creation of clinical skills programs in the first place. This,
perhaps, should come as no surprise. The more clinicians inquire into
their own as well as traditionalist pedagogical assumptions, the clearer it
612 (1984); Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn
from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981).
17. A quick inventory of some of the best known texts in clinical legal education dem-
onstrates the high priority given to the "how to's" of lawyering. See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM,
TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1978); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON,
THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); P.
BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY (1982); D.BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUN-
SELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YES
(1981); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS (1978); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1980); J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS (1983).
The underlying theory, expressed in another context, is that
Play acting like child's play is a ritualized form of exploration of the world that is
both enjoyable and challenging while being structured to move towards a satisfy-
ing learning conclusion. Seeing is better than hearing and doing is better than
seeing. Or as an old Chinese proverb has it:
I hear, I forget.
I see; I remember.
I do; I understand.
J. De Young, supra note 1, at 5.
18. See Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 277
(1982). Indeed, clinical law teachers have recognized that the structure and focus of their
courses may well be the result of historical accident or the demands of funding needs
rather than the consequence of planning in response to well thought out pedagogical
objectives.
[Vol. 68:3
1991] SHAKESPEARE COMES TO THE CLASSROOM 393
becomes that the number of things that lawyers do, and therefore must
learn, is mind boggling.
For example, law can be perceived of as a helping profession. Since
lawyers work with people, they must talk with them, understand their
needs, and work with them to solve problems. 19 This requires the abil-
ity to communicate, and communication requires an understanding of
values and language and of the interplay between the two. 20 This, in
turn, may require an understanding of political, socio-economic, and
historical contexts. 2 1 To provide a client with adequate information
19. "The beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life is talking with a client
about what is to be done." Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 231 (1979); "The skills of the successful lawyer lay in mastery of the human interac-
tion and in subtle awareness of the emotions, concerns and anxieties of others as well as in
the knowledge of how to utilize that awareness to advance the attorney's professional aims
in the interaction." Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27
J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975). "This is a practice,/ As full of labour as a wise man's art." W.
SHAKESPEARE, Twelfth Night, act 3, sc. 1, lines 64-65. The way in which attorney-client dis-
cussions are to be carried out has been a subject of some interest. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); M.
SCHOENFIELD & B. SCHOENFIELD, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1982); T. SHAF-
FER & R. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); A. WATSON, THE LAW-
YER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976).
There is a considerable amount of non-legal literature dealing with the process of
communication in professional or quasi-professional settings that is of use to law teachers
as well. The work of Carl Rogers has been of particular interest to clinical law teachers.
E.g., C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961) excerpted in INTERPERSONAL DYNANMICS
287 (Bennis et al eds. 1968). Other articles of note in this volume include Davis, The Cab
Driver and His Fare: Facets of a Fleeting Relationship, at 556 and Gibb, Defensive Communication,
at 606. See also A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW (2d ed. 1974); BERNSTEIN & BERN-
STEIN, INTERVIEWING: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONAL (1976); J. CHILDRESS, WHO
SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
20. Jerome Bruner, in his work on the importance of language to the development of
what he terms the "transactional self" (a self that is both "personal" and part of a culture),
addresses this idea in depth. See, e.g., J.S. Bruner, Development of a Transactional Self
(Apr. 29-30, 1983) (paper presented at the conference of the Erikson Institute, Chicago,
Ill.) See also A.M. Quinton, Contemporary British Philosophy reprinted in WrrrGENSTEIN, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 8-21 (G. Pitcher ed. 1966.) One attempt to deal with the
problems of interpersonal communications has been made by developing an attorney-cli-
ent communications model which takes into account the varied sensory-based ways in
which people experience the world. Barkai, A New Model for Legal Communications: Sensory
Experience and Representational Systems, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575 (1980). See also W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, The Tempest, act II, scene 1 ("You cram these words into mine ears against the
stomach of my sense."). Another approach is suggested by Clark Cunningham, who en-
courages attorneys to translate client language into jury language. For further under-
standing of the philosophical bases of the interplay between language and values, see
Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potentialfor Transforma-
tive Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988).
21. Many would see this as a need for political action, not just as a need for recogni-
tion or understanding. "We must not make a scarecrow of the law,/ Setting it up to fear
the birds of prey,/ And let it keep one shape till custom make it/ Their perch, and not their
terror." W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure For Aeasure, act 2, sc. 1, lines 1-6; Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity, A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C. R.- C. L. L.
REV. 295 (1988) (taking the view that law is ideology); Pellar, The Metaphysics of American
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (asserting that legal discourse is political or mythical).
See also Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process,
1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39 (1985) (examining the impact of the increased presence of
women in the legal profession on the practice of the law). The title of Menkel-Meadow's
article is, of course, derived from the character Portia in W. SHAKESPEARE, Merchant of eln-
ice; Folsom & Roberts, The Warwick Story: Being Led Down the Contextual Path of the Law, 30J.
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to make decisions, a lawyer may need to know basic psychiatry, be profi-
cient in math, or understand the inner workings of large
bureaucracies.
22
Another view of the law focuses on the nature of the legal system. If
the system is primarily perceived as an adversarial one, particular atten-
tion must be paid to its philosophical underpinnings, especially insofar
as they have been adopted or institutionalized by the profession.2 3 As
advocates in an adversarial system, lawyers take on a certain role. An
understanding of that role and its implications is necessary to competent
performance in that role.24 Adequate performance in this role may also
entail competency in dramatic arts, public speaking skills, the ability to
strategize and compete, and persuasive writing.
The trend toward specialization in law practice suggests another ap-
proach to teaching. To the extent that students enter law school or the
profession with the expectation of practicing in a particularized area,
there is a tendency to gravitate toward courses and clinics which relate
LEGAL EDUC. 166 (1979). These contexts affect the lawyer as much as the law and legal
problems. SeeJ. KATz, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974). See generally
C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973).
22. This need has been identified by supporters of the Langdellian scientific ortho-
doxy. R. Clark, The Return ofLangdell, 8 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 299 (1985). Clark asserts
that first year students require some grounding in statistics, model building and cognitive
psychology to enable them as lawyers to ferret out errors in legal reasoning. Id. at 307. See
also T. C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (mathematical principles applied to
negotiation); Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy - Especially in Commer-
cial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (1946) (identifying a need to understand "opera-
tional" systems); Monahan & Walker, Teaching Social Science in Law: An Alternative to "Law
and Society," 35J. LEGAL EDUC. 478 (1985).
There is no lack of material intended to acquaint lawyers with the basic precepts of
other disciplines relevant to law practice. E.g. W. CURTIS, MICROECONOMIC CONCErs FOR
ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1984); D. HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS (1980); M. HOOTS, LAWYERS GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF (1966); A. MOENssEs, F.
INBAU &J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (3rd ed. 1986);J. RUBIN, Eco-
NOMICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (1978); T. SANNrro & P. McGOVERN, COURTROOM
PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS (1985); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1978).
23. The norms of the profession are perhaps best gleaned from the ABA Standards
relating to professional conduct: "Toward the client the lawyer is a counselor and an advo-
cate; toward the prosecutor the lawyer is a professional adversary; toward the court the
lawyer is both advocate for the client and counselor to the court." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-8 (1980). Because "[a]dvocacy is not for the timid, the meek, or the
retiring," and because "[o]ur system of justice is inherently contentious . . . it demands
that the lawyer be inclined toward vigorous advocacy." Id. Voices have been raised against
too-strict adherence to these principles. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
justice and Professional Ethics, I Wis. L. REV. 30 (1978)(discussing the implications of wide-
spread unquestioning acceptance of certain professional norms, including the belief in the
legitimacy of the system). See also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1 (1975) (raising questions about whether "it is a good thing for lawyers to be
so professional-for them to embrace so completely this role-differentiated way of ap-
proaching matters"). Id. at 8.
24. There are many writings from the lawyer's perspective on their professional role
and its implications. A number of them have been collected in DVORKIN, HIMMELSTEIN &
LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER (1981), and can be also found in BELLOW & MOULTON, THE
LAWYERING PROCESS (1978). Some interesting implications of role assumption are also ad-
dressed in Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 87, 89-93 (1982); and Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64
VA. L. REV. 735 (1978).
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to those particular substantive interests. In-depth knowledge of sub-
stantive areas of law is considered both desirable and necessary by many
law teachers as well as students. Because clinics in most instances serve
a disempowered minority or class, there may be an increased danger
that clients will be exploited in the name of education and will be dis-
served by student representatives lacking basic understanding of the law
in the field in which they are operating. Thus intense inculcation in sub-
stantive law is considered a necessary prerequisite to the rendering of
services by students.
Process as well as substantive law can be viewed as essential content
to clinical law courses. Whereas traditional law courses stress analytical
thinking and demonstrable inferential logic as necessary components to
the process of "thinking like a lawyer," clinical courses may concentrate
more on creative problem solving and intuition as critical to legal
thought processes. 25 In addition, process as content can take the form
of deliberate observation, reflection, and self-analysis. 2 6 This suggests a
process-oriented and experientially-based approach to teaching, or per-
haps more accurately, to developing ethical standards.
27
The acme of the process orientation may be the theory that the real
25. "Clinical legal education, while attending to cognitive changes, has emphasized
learning in the affective and active dimensions." Harbaugh, Simulation and Gaming: A Teach-
ing/Learning Strategy for Clinical Legal Education, REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOoLs-A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 191, 198
(1980). It may be that the exposure to the real world of practice is what leads to this
approach to developing thought processes. As Emily Calhoun notes, "The genius of a trial
lawyer lies in knowing when to appeal to logic and when to appeal to values or unprovable
intuition." Calhoun, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 507, 512 (1984). Good
litigators, in other words, can sometimes ". . . see that most noble and most sovereign
reason, Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet act 3,
sc. 1, lines 157-158.
26. See SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACIIONER (1988) for a full development of this no-
tion. Of a student successfully taught by such a method, it might be said: "He is a great
observer, and he looks/ Quite through the deeds of men." W. SHAKESPEARE,Julius Caesar
act 1, sc. 2, lines 202-203. Clinical law teachers normally incorporate constructive critique
methods, including self-critique methods, into their supervisory sessions and thus tend to
be conscious of the process. Motley, supra note 15, at 749-50. In doing so, they certainly
can emphasize the same analytical skills that are central to Langdell's orthodoxy, especially
in the classroom. Some, perhaps many, clinical teachers are prone to utilize teaching meth-
odologies such as the Socratic method generally associated with more traditional law
courses. There is a belief that the clinical methodology merely adds a new dimension to or
is only marginally different from more conventional methodologies, Bloch, The Andragogi-
cal Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321 (1982); Barnhizer, supra note 13,
and that it is in danger of becoming even more like the system from which it rebelled.
Kennedy, supra, note 13, at 7. See also Tushnet, supra note 14 (suggesting that the leanings
toward acceptance or integration of traditional methods should be resisted).
27. Thus, it has been advocated that professional conduct in the mental health pro-
vider field be taught, tested and modified through "active experimentation and concrete
experience," even if the risk is that, by working through the decision making process them-
selves, students will reject professional codes of conduct. Pelsma & Borgers, Experience-
Based Ethics: A Developmental Model of Learning Ethical Reasoning, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEY.
311, 313 (1986). Although the teaching of ethics has long been a concern of clinical law
teachers, see COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THIRD
BIENIAL REPORT, 1973-1974 (1974), there has been some resistance to entrusting this task
to clinical education. See Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 392-93 (1980).
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goal of the educational system, or at least that part designated as
"clinical," ought to be one of empowering students to teach themselves.
The thrust of most self-directed learning proposals is that teachers
should facilitate a process by which students are ultimately transformed
into their teachers' equals.28 Among the advantages cited for adopting
a self-directed learning approach are: (1) such learning coincides with
normal psychological development toward a more independent and ma-
ture self,29 and (2) learners can be expected to continue to assimilate
ever-increasing amounts of needed new knowledge over time.3 0
Regardless of what substantive approach to legal education is fa-
vored, law teachers cannot teach everything.3 1 The choices with respect
to content are difficult and frustrating. If students are plied with sub-
stantive law, how will they learn what to do with it? If they are not, do
the clients suffer? Is it reasonable to expect that students will grapple
with professional responsibility issues in their ethics classes and will
have been provided adequate foundations in research and writing skills
in their first year legal methods classes? Are clinical law teachers quali-
fied to teach about matters having psychological components?
Even the goal of teaching students to teach themselves, however
valid, is rife with complications. For one thing, students raised in educa-
tional environments notable for using external reinforcements such as
grades as learning incentives may resist or have difficulty adjusting to
the demands of self-education. The learning quotient in such situations
may decrease in the short term.3 2 This has obvious implications for
clinical programs in which clients are dependent on the students' ability
to assimilate a significant amount of information quickly and which, be-
cause of their intensity and the time demands made on students, are
likely to suffer from student frustration and attendant decreased motiva-
28. M. KNOWLES, SELF DIRECTED LEARNING 14, 29 (1975). Knowles' theories are ap-
plied to the clinical legal education context in Bloch, supra note 26. Actually, Shakespeare
may have forecasted this trend when he wrote, "[b]e governed by your knowledge and
proceed/ I' the sway of your own will." W. SHAKESPEARE, King Lear, act 4, sc. 7, lines 19-
20.
29. KNOWLES, supra note 28, at 14. It has been asserted that with self-directed learn-
ing, "the self-actualized person experiences an integration of self and an integration of
experience into a meaningful whole" during which the person "feels more whole, more
alive, more at one with the world, more self-sufficient." M. Kersh, Integrative Curriculum
for Gifted Learners 2 (April, 1987) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Education Research Association, Wash., D.C., April 20-24, 1987).
30. KNOWLES, supra note 28, at 16; P. Beare, The Contract-An Individualized Ap-
proach to Competency-Based Learning and Evaluation 1 (Oct., 1986) (paper presented at
15th annual conference of Internat'l Soc. for Individualized Instruction, Atlanta, Ga., Oct.
9-11, 1986). Other possible advantages may be reduction of stress, which has been attrib-
uted in part to the one-exam system, see Archer & Peters, Law Student Stress, 23 NAT'L A.
STUDENT PERSONNEL ADINS.J. 48 (1986), and the greater development of talent. A. Astin,
Assessment, Value-Added and Educational Excellence, 15 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 89
(1987).
31. As it is, "[m]ore to know/ Did never meddle with my thoughts." W. SHAKESPEARE,
The Tempest, act I, sc. 2, lines 22-23.
32. K. Duckworth, Intelligence, Motivation, and Academic Work: An Operations Per-
spective (March 25, 1983) (paper commissioned by the National Commission on Excel-
lence in Education, Mar. 25, 1983).
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tion. In addition, the recognition of different styles and paces of learn-
ing makes the task of teaching self-directed learning a particularly
difficult one.
3 3
Given that every legal educator cannot teach everything, choices
about what to teach have to be made. One way of looking at the choices
is to see them as mutually exclusive. In deciding what to teach and how
to go about it, it is certainly possible to restrict one's self to a very lim-
ited number of topics and methodologies. For example, one could de-
cide to focus exclusively on interpersonal skills taught through lecture
and discussion, or one could choose to teach substantive bankruptcy law
by means of role playing. It is, however, also possible to avoid the con-
clusion of mutual exclusivity and recognize both the importance of all
the learning areas and the individual teacher's inability to teach every-
thing there is to know in all these important areas. The choices can be
seen as providing a wide range of interesting and relevant topics and
methods from which individual educators and institutions can select in
ways that best serve their purposes.3 4 This calls for selective incorpora-
tion of learning areas and methodologies.
3 5
III. ONE APPROACH TO COURSE DESIGN
There are, no doubt, as many ways to design a syllabus as there are
law teachers to do it. In this section, I describe only one of the ways of
conceptualizing a clinical seminar, that being my own. It is an illustra-
tion of how a selective incorporation approach to course design can
work when non-legal subject areas are included in the learning areas to
be incorporated.
I should point out that in putting together my class syllabus, I am
guided by several principles. First, I believe that students do learn in
different ways and that it is important to attend to their different needs
33. Much work has been done in the development of learning models from a number
of different perspectives. Chief among the various theories seem to be those which identify
stages of development. See, e.g., A. CHICKERING, EDUCATION AND IDENTIrF (1969);
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347-480 (1969); Kolb & Fry, Toward an
Applied Theory of Experiential Learning, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES (G. Cooper, ed.
1975); the "whole brain" theories developed by Abraham Maslow among others, see, e.g.,
A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1969); K. Bruch, Bridging Curriculum with
Creative Development, 30 GIFTED CHILD Q. No. 4 (Fall 1986); and studies collected in IN-
TEGRATIVE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN THOUGHT (H. Morgenau, ed. 1972); and those which
concern themselves with the impact of environmental factors and dynamics to explain in-
tellectual growth patterns, e.g., A. ASTIN, ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE (1985);
K.A. Feldman, Some Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Change and Stability of College Students,
42 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 1 (1972); G. STERN, PEOPLE IN CONTEXT: MEASURING PERSON-ENVI-
RONMENT CONGRUENCE IN EDUCATION AND INDUSTRY (1970).
34. This seems almost too obvious to state. A number of law teachers have made
recommendations regarding how to go about identifying priorities and begin the process
of selection. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 26; Hoffman, supra note 18.
35. I have no doubt that most law teachers do engage in a process of selective incor-
poration in designing their courses. If my method of course design differs from my col-
leagues in any notable way, I believe it is more a matter of degree than anything else, and
is based on the belief that the range of learning areas and teaching methodologies from
which it is possible to draw is endless.
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as much as is reasonably possible. I also lean to the view that my job is
to give students the push they need to get started in their chosen profes-
sion, so that they can carry on confidently without my assistance a few
months or years down the road.3 6 Finally, I believe that contributing to
my own growth and maintaining an interest in my work are important
goals that should not be overlooked in deciding what and how to teach.
With those precepts always in mind, I move to designing the class
syllabus. In keeping with the general goal of empowering students to
learn on their own, I attempt to identify subject areas and teaching
methods that can serve as the source for learning something outside and
beyond the classroom. I think of these learning areas in simple (if trite)
metaphorical terms as "seeds." For example, a focal point of a class
nominally dealing with counseling might be the process of decision mak-
ing. Decision making is clearly not an activity that is limited to the con-
text of counseling. In fact it is not limited to lawyering activities at all.
An individual who understands the process of decision making can apply
that understanding to other life decisions. It is, therefore, a skill that
aids in learning and self development. The subject area of decision
making, taught in the context of a counseling class, has the potential to
"blossom" later in other situations and thus helps insure the individual's
continued growth.
3 7
Consistent with the belief that people learn in different ways, I have
found it works best to select seeds from several different categories for
each class or series of classes. These categories include skills, substan-
tive law, values issues, and overlapping interdisciplinary theory. I like-
wise try to utilize several different teaching methods in each class, such
as non-legal role plays, problem solving, simulation, non-legal games,
and lecture with discussion.
As important as it is for the subject matter and learning method to
have intrinsic interest for me, it is equally important that the subject
matter and learning method have some intrinsic interest for the stu-
dents. 38 There are many ways in which student interest can be piqued.
Some measure of familiarity with the subject area may do the trick. For
example, they studied this subject in college or played this game in kin-
dergarten. Non-threatening novelty, especially combined with humor,
can likewise be appealing. Predictably, student interest is affected by the
degree to which it is apparent that what they learn in the classroom has a
direct relationship to what they are doing in their field work or will be
doing in practice. It also helps if students are able to see the relation-
ship of any given class to other classes or to the course as a whole.
36. The students "must be taught, and trained, and bid go forth." The hope is that
they will not thereafter be "barren spirited," feeding on "abjects, orts, and imitations."
W. SHAKESPEARE,JUIUS Caesar, act 4, sc. 1, lines 35-37.
37. "Their understanding/ Begins to swell; and the approaching tide/ will shortly fill
the reasonable shore/ That now lies foul and muddy." W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 5,
sc. I, lines 79-82.
38. Motivational theories of particular significance to clinical law teachers are dis-
cussed in Harbaugh, supra note 25, at 199-205.
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Learning cannot take place in an environment in which students are
forever in fear that they will be criticized or embarrassed. Many stu-
dents embark upon their law school experience with intrepidation and
nearly all enter clinical programs intimidated by the responsibility of cli-
ent representation. For most students, it is no easy task to perform for
courts and clients (even simulated ones) in the role of a lawyer. The
need to create a non-threatening environment in which the first fright-
ening steps toward being a professional can take place is of particular
importance in skills-oriented teaching.3 9 It is important to earn the stu-
dents' trust by expressing over and over again, in the first few classes
especially, support and confidence in their abilities. It is equally impor-
tant to reinforce students' support of each other and to impress upon
them both the need to work cooperatively rather than competitively (as
many learned to do in their first semester or two of law school, if not
before) and the responsibility each person bears towards the others in
the learning process. In this way, a foundation can be laid upon which
students individually and as a group can build. The idea is to create a
relatively safe environment in which planted seeds can develop.
The overall methodological strategy for all this is to demystify the
giant of lawyering by breaking it down into recognizable parts that can
be analyzed, mastered, put into a legal context, and finally incorporated
into an increasingly larger whole. Each of my classes has a goal of its
own and provides some measure of closure. At the same time, each
class fits into a series (usually a series of three), with each class relating
to the others in the series and each successive class building on the class
before it. There are recurring themes in many of the classes which help
the students see their work as part of a much bigger picture as well.
IV. THE PROCESS OF INCORPORATING SHAKESPEARE
Shakespeare fits into this teaching framework very well. Fortui-
tously, in 1987 The American University hosted a debate in which the
origins of Shakespeare's works was at issue. The debate, the brainchild
of Shakespeare enthusiast David Lloyd Kreeger,40 took the form of an
appellate argument before three justices of the United States Supreme
Court: Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, andJohn Paul Stevens. Rep-
resenting the appellant in the case, Edward deVere, who claimed to be
the true author of the works historically attributed to Shakespeare, was
PeterJaszi, a professor of law at the American University's Washington
College of Law. Representing William Shakespeare before the Court
was Professor Jaszi's colleague at the Washington College of Law, Pro-
fessor James Boyle.4 1 The debate proved to be a rich source of class
39. I agree with Gary Goodpaster when he says "It is difficult to overemphasize the
need for openness in class atmosphere, in the instructor and in the students." Goodpaster,
supra note 19, at 7.
40. Mr. Kreeger, himself a lawyer among other things, also serves as chairman of the
Board of the Corcoran Gallery of Art and the Washington Opera.
41. A full description of the debate, the briefs of the parties, the opinions of the jus-
tices, and Professors Jaszi's and Boyle's reflective comments on the project are contained
1991] 399
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material for an appellate seminar.
The question of whether to use the debate as a teaching tool was an
easy one; the possibilities seemed endless. The process of deciding how
to use it was more problematical and required some brainstorming on
the possibilities. What follows is an abbreviated and considerably better
organized version of the brainstorming process by which specific poten-
tial subject areas for teaching were identified, considered, and either
adopted or rejected. The choice of substantive content took precedence
over decisions as to methodology. Teaching methodologies such as
moot court-type arguments, edited tape review, and directed class dis-
cussions mentioned here in passing are specifically identified only be-
cause they are methodologies that seemed to jump out given the
appellate argument structure of the Shakespeare debate already in
place. Although decisions regarding methodology could be made in ad-
vance of decisions regarding class topics, here, because the starting
point was a non-legal subject of interest, it seemed to make sense to first
ascertain in what ways that subject matter related to topics associated
with the practice of law before deciding on the specific method for incor-
porating an as yet undetermined topic into the curriculum.4 2 The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of particular methodologies available for
each topic or class do have to be weighed,43 a process which I believe is
most effectively illustrated by the description in Part V of the choices
ultimately made in this instance.
4 4
The first broad subject area considered was written advocacy. At a
very basic writing skills level, students could be given one or both briefs
or portions of the briefs and could be required to write responsive argu-
ments or summaries of arguments. The purpose of such an exercise
would be to get students to work on such elements of their writing as
organization, clarity, emphasis, and accuracy. The same things could be
addressed by having the students critique the briefs written by the par-
ticipants in the debate and compare and contrast the writing styles and
in In Re Shakespeare: The Question of Authorship, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 609 (1988). The debate
before the justices was also filmed and broadcast on public television.
42. This, then, is certainly not to make light of the decision as to methodology. "As
teachers we must first collect, understand, and organize our material. But we must, in the
end, pass on that material to students in a way that insures that meaningful learning oc-
curs." Harbaugh, supra note 25, at 222.
43. Some of these advantages and disadvantages have been analyzed with reference to
particular teaching methodologies. As the title of his report indicates, Dean Harbaugh has
advocated the integration of gaming and simulation methods into clinical law teaching. Id.
Simulation and gaming exercises are two of five clinical methods examined in the article by
Boon, supra note 12 (the others being work experience, computer technology, and obser-
vation exercises). Role playing as an effective teaching methodology is addressed in
Cabral, Role Playing as a Group Intervention, 18 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 470 (1982). A commu-
nication and psychological interaction model specifically geared to law teaching is the sub-
ject of Gary Goodpaster's article, supra note 20. The use of non-legal role plays as an
effective teaching method is discussed in Bergman, Sherr & Burridge, Learning From Experi-
ence: Non Legally-Specific Role Plays, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 535 (1987). Peter Hoffman looks at
five methodologies-role assumption, evaluation, demonstration, expository teaching, and
dialectic teaching, supra note 18.
44. "Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act
2, sc. 2, lines 203-04.
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techniques used by the authors of the briefs.
4 5
A slightly more sophisticated approach to analyzing writing tech-
niques and styles would be to construct a class around the role of truth
in brief writing and how that "truth" is presented.4 6 Discussions could
also center around questions of perspective or point of view.4 7 A closer
look at specific word choices and language makes for yet a different kind
of class discussion.
4 8
45. Countless books have been written on the subject of legal writing. E.g., M.
FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985); A. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY
(1984); R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE - FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS
(1983); M. MOSKowrrz, WINNING AN APPEAL (1983); E. RE, BRIEF WRITING & ORAL ARGU-
MENT (5th ed. 1983); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); F. WIE-
NER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967). This list is by no means exhaustive.
46. Discussions about the relationship between the "facts" of a case and "truth" al-
ways seem to pique considerable student interest. The notion that there is an objective
truth to be known is prevalent. It often takes some time for students to realize that lawyers,
also, must grapple with the idea that "[t]he truth or falsity ofstatements is affected by what
they leave out or put in or by their being misleading and so on," and that "'true' and
'false', like 'free' and 'unfree,' do not stand for anything simple at all, but only for a gen-
eral dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in
these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions." J.
AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 143-44 (1962). In litigation, "[b]ecause one
cannot usually return in a time machine to show a trier of fact 'what really happened,'
investigations do not produce 'facts.' They produce evidence from which the trier of fact
will resolve the parties' dispute(s) by deciding the probable facts." D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN,
FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 6 (1984). The difficulty with ascertaining
truth in the adversary system is effectively demonstrated in Susan Glaspell's play Trifes
(copyright 1920 by Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., renewed by S. Glaspell, 1948). (The movie
version of Glaspell's play, A Jury of Her Peers, may be familiar to some.)
47. Perspective and point of view are closely aligned to the concept of truth. In weav-
ing a story and bringing characters to life, the narrator necessarily begins somewhere and
makes decisions that will be reflective of a particular point of view. Disciplined writers (and
speakers) are conscious of this approach.
As Professor Jaszi points out, the question of who wrote Shakespeare's works will be
determined to some extent on the basis of how Shakespeare himself is portrayed. Critics,
he notes, have thus described Shakespeare as, inter alia, gardener, lawyer, doctor and
sailor. Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote "Shakespeare"?, 37 Am. U.L. REV. 617, 619; See also Jaszi,
Brief of Appellant Edward De Vere, Seventeenth Earl of Oxford, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 645, 673-74.Just
as the sailor may be perceived as less likely to be the author of Hamlet than some other
candidate for authorship of Shakespeare's works, a client, party or witness portrayed as a
poet will be perceived differently from the person identified as a politician or pauper.
48. Language and literary style may be presumed to have limited definitions in the
law.
If it were only teachers who insisted that.. .writers stay close to literary styles of
the past, we might reasonably ignore them. But readers insist on the very same
thing. They want our pages to look very much like pages they have seen before.
Why? It is because they themselves have a tough job to do, and they need all the
help they can get from us .... They have to read, an art so difficult that most
people do not really master it ....
So... our stylistic options as writers are neither numerous nor glamorous,
since our readers are bound to be such imperfect artists.
K. VONNEGUT, PALM SUNDAY 80 (1981). Vonnegut was not speaking about legal writing,
although he could have been.
Notwithstanding the limits within which lawyers operate, much work can be done to
increase awareness of the impact of word choices and phrasing and to alleviate the
problems resulting from what George Orwell called "pretentious diction," "verbal false
limbs," and "meaningless words," see G. Orwell, Politics and the English Language 337 in 4
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETrTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 130-32 (S.
Orwell & I. Angus eds. 1968), and to improve the lucidity of what is written. Such efforts
can mean the difference between verbal products consisting primarily of "dead carcasses
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The topic of oral persuasion is at least as obvious a choice as that of
writing skills. Students could themselves do oral arguments based on
the briefs, either in class or in out-of-class taped sessions. The effective-
ness of various techniques could be analyzed by means of in-class criti-
ques, self critiques, or class discussion of edited tapes. As with the
possible writing skills options, here, because the actual arguments are
available on tape, students could review and critique those instead of
engaging in the oral advocacy themselves. Some fairly typical goals of
this critiquing process would be to alert students to the proper and ef-
fective use of humor and sympathy in oral argument, to help them de-
velop ways of simplifying their arguments and making them more
memorable, and to work on the concept of anticipatory rebuttal.
49
On a slightly different plane, the tapes and student presentations
could be used to analyze performance issues, as opposed to content is-
sues. Dramatic techniques involving body language, memory and deliv-
ery, listening, and audience bonding would be appropriate subjects to
develop. 50 Also of particular importance for discussion in the legal con-
text would be questions relating to the effects of role expectations, ego
threats, and other underlying needs or inhibitions. 5
of words," Y. OUOLOGUEM, BOUND TO VIOLENCE 137 (1968), and those constituted of the
kind of words describable as "damned sparks of syllables that set fire to the blood .... C.
FUENTES, THE DEATH OF ARTEMIO CRUZ 41 (1964). For further readings, see D. Allison,
Translator's Introduction toJ. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA AND OTHER ESSAYS ON Hus-
SERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS (1983); TRUTH AND MEANING: ESSAYS IN SEMANTICS (G. Evans &J.
McDowell eds. 1976).
49. As in the area of legal writing, there is no dearth of material on the skill of oral
advocacy. Indeed, the vast majority of books dealing with the subject of written advocacy
also include chapters on oral advocacy. For a listing of some of these works, see supra note
45.
50. Unlike many others who have tackled the subject of oral advocacy, Bea Moulton
and Gary Bellow devote substantial space to the arts of rhetoric and drama in their book.
Bellow and Moulton, supra note 17, at 914-23, 937-56, 638-45. For additional information,
see B. BATES, THE WAY OF THE ACTOR: A PATH TO KNOWLEDGE & POWER (1987); V. SPOLIN,
IMPROVISATION FOR THE THEATRE (1983);J.L. HANNA, THE PERFORMER-AUDIENCE CONNEC-
TION (1983). Theatrical interpretation-by producers and audiences alike-is a subject of
interest to Shakespeare scholars. As a result, a number of texts deal with the subject of
interpretation specifically in the context of Shakespeare's plays. SeeJaszi, supra note 47, at
620-21, and supra notes 6-8.
51. Motivating and inhibiting factors, frequently discussed in the context of counsel-
ing, deserve attention when attorneys and judges engage in a dialogue, if the advocate
does not wish to be told, "your words/and performance are no kin together." W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, Othello, act 4, sc. 2, lines 185-86. Legal argument must be more than an entertain-
ing performance; it is intended to be persuasive. Similarly, argument that is substantively
persuasive (i.e. good rhetoric) fails if the arguments are not heard or understood by the
audience. This suggests that a focus on the communicative and persuasive aspects of oral
discourse is desirable. Literature dealing with these subjects abounds. E.g., H. ABELSON
AND M. KARLINS, PERSUASION: How OPINIONS AND ATITrUDES ARE CHANGED (1959); K. AN-
DERSON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1971); HOVLAND & JANIS, COMMUNICATION
AND PERSUASION (1972); W. MINNICK, THE ART OF PERSUASION (1957). For some thought-
ful insights on the psychology and ethics of persuasion, see F. Haiman, Democratic Ethics and
The Hidden Persuaders, 44 Q. J. SPEECH 385 (1958) and White, Persuasion and Community in
Sophocles Philoctetes, in HERACLES Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW
(1985).
At another level, an understanding of differences in communication patterns is worth
studying, particularly if attorneys and clients are representative of minority cultures. Per-
spectives on issues of difference that might be worth exploring include the gender-associ-
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Moving from the performance skills orientation to the analytical,
one could use the briefs and oral arguments to focus on the logical con-
nections between factual premises and conclusions. What inferences are
drawn? What authorities are used to support the inferences? What pre-
dictions are made and what role do the predictions play in the choice of
arguments? 52 Students could be asked to work through their ideas in
advance of class or the process could be initiated in class, with a full
development of logical constructs following.
With regard to substantive areas, it would be possible to have the
students review the opinions of the justices on their merits and analyze
the reasons for the decision as they might in any other class. Several
aspects of this case deserve particular attention; for one thing, the par-
ties are dead. In addition, there is no lower court record nor any prece-
dent to guide the court. The absence of these elements could be the
basis for a discussion about their ordinarily presumed importance or ne-
cessity. Thejustices who heard the case, in making their decision, relied
heavily on the fact that deVere bore the burden of persuasion. This
might prompt an inquiry into the standard of review and the deference
to be given lower courts.5 3 In their briefs, the parties examined at
length historical and sociological factors, 54 which might suggest as a
ated view proposed by C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982), the cross-cultural
approach to body language addressed in LaBarre, The Language of Gestures and Emotions,
reprinted in INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 14, at 197, and the call to listen to the
"voices at the bottom" in Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). See also,Julius Caesar W. SHAKESPEARE, act I,
sc. 2, line 284: "But for my own part, it was Greek to me."
52. Although logical reasoning or deduction may be the heritage of western philo-
sophical thought and the foundation of the Socratic method widely used in American law
schools, it is a method with which many students "being young, till now ripe not to rea-
son," W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 2, sc. 2, line 128, in fact seem to
have little or no familiarity. Were they more familiar with Shakespeare's works, they might
come to a greater appreciation of these skills. See, e.g., W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer
Night's Dream, act 2, sc. 2, lines 129-30 "And touching now the point of human skill,/
Reason becomes the marshal to my will."; W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 4, sc. 4, lines 36-39
"He that made us with such large discourse,/Looking before and after, gave us not/That
capability and godlike reason/To fust in us unused."; W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 4,
Sc. 1, lines 66-68 "rising senses/Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle/Their
clearer reason." A useful source for a full understanding of the practical applications of
deductive reasoning to law practice is D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION:
FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984).
53. See Martineau, supra note 8;J. PURVER & L. TAYLOR, HANDLING CRIMINAL APPEALS
(1980); see also Note, Ponduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.: De Novo Review and the
Federal Circuit's Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 963 (1987);
Case Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): Applicability of the "Clearly Erroneous" Test to
Findings of Fact in All Nonjury Cases, 29 How. LJ. 639 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Indeed, a substantial portion of the Appellant's brief is devoted to untangling the
historical events which led to the conclusion that Shakspeare of Stratford wrote the works
attributed to him and to setting forth historical facts supporting the claim that someone
other than Shakspeare of Stratford (allegedly Edward deVere), was the true author. The
appellee, for his part, argues that the appellant "ignores the historical, social and artistic
context in which the plays were written." Brief of Appellant Edward De Vere, Seventeenth Earl of
Oxford, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 725, 733. Appellee also counters with a few historical facts of his
own, including the fact that deVere was dead before all the plays were published. Id. at
745.
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topic for discussion the appropriate reliance on non-legal authority and
use of "Brandeis briefs."
55
The case against Shakespeare presents special problems of issue de-
velopment. Much relevant information is unknown or unknowable or, if
known, suspect. 56 Although most cases handled by the students do not
suffer from the same extreme dearth of information, there are often
problems of incomplete records, problems which may be exacerbated
when there is access to information (from a client, for example) that will
never be part of the record. Posing a question like "did Shakespeare
write Shakespeare?" provides opportunities for brainstorming, discover-
ing creative theories, and developing ways of testing the strength and
validity of theories. 57 The brainstorming process leads into the process
of classification and organization, which in turn provides fodder for dis-
cussion of how to frame issues.58 Role issues abound in this context as
in any other. Who is the client? How does one relate to an absent cli-
ent?59 What is the importance of the client to the case? Must others'
interests be taken into account? What are the attorneys' obligations to
55. A Brandeis brief, named after the noted jurist Louis Brandeis, is "[a]n appellate
brief in which economic and social studies are included along with legal principles."
WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY (1985).
56. This is what ProfessorJaszi calls "[tihe informational void surrounding the histor-
ical Shakespeare." Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote "Shakespeare"?, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 617, 623
(1988). According to Professor Boyle, "the whole imposing edifice of Shakespearian biog-
raphy rests on a set of facts which one could fit onto-if not a postcard-then at least three
medium sized sheets of paper." Boyle, Brief of Appellee William Shakespeare of Stratford-Upon-
Avon, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 725, 729 (1988).
57. Thus, "imagination bodies forth/the forms of things unknown..." W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 5, sc. 1, lines 14-15, and "All difficulties are but easy
when they are known." W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act 4, sc. 2, line 172. Creative
problem solving is a not-entirely-new, though perhaps underused, approach to the legal
issues. See, e.g., Hegland, supra note 17, at 180-85. The initial stages of creative thought are
developed inJ. GUILFORD, WAY BEYOND THE IQ 160-80 (1977) and in A. OSBORN, APPLIED
IMAGINATION 125-36 (1963). For an understanding of how creativity can be blocked, read
B. UELAND, IF YOU WANT To WRrrE 28-39 (1987); R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTOR-
CYCLE MAINTENANCE 270-94 (1974). Pirsig also provides a brief, readable description of
theory development. Id. at 62-67, 252-59. The same ideas are explicated somewhat less
colorfully in Osborn, supra, at 86-109. Those wishing to explore concepts of creativity fur-
ther may find it useful to consult S. PARNES, A SOURCE BOOK FOR CREATIVE THINKING
(Parnes & Harding, eds. 1962).
58. A simple checklist for evaluating theories which includes recognizing underlying
assumptions, evaluating authority and understanding problems of language is contained in
the NEw YORK TIMES: GUIDE TO REFERENCE MATERIALS 185-86 (rev. ed. 1985). The pro-
cess of systematizing ideas and of organizing them is clearly explained by Guilford, supra
note 57, at 34-37. The relevance and application of the skill of idea association to the
process of classification is described by Osborn, supra note 57, at 111-21. Lawyers, in de-
veloping case theories and framing issues, of course go through this process, even if not
consciously. One lawyer's attempt to simplify and clarify the process of issue classification
by creating a full taxonomy of cases appears in A. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY 74-
127 (1984).
59. This is an issue that students in an appellate practice clinic face rather frequently.
Clients are likely to be federal prisoners to whom access is often frequently restricted. The
absent client problem can occur in trial work as well for a number of reasons, including the
fact that some clients simply never communicate with their attorneys before trial. In other
cases, such as class actions, the clients are many and geographically widely distributed, and
some clients, such as very young children or the severely mentally disabled, may be liter-
ally present but incapable of communicating.
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the Court in this case? Does the role of the attorney change depending
on what is at stake and whose interests are involved?
60
Viewing any event, decision, or belief in its historical or political
context is likely to affect perception. Analyzing the question of the au-
thorship of Shakespeare's works in the context of 16th or early 17th cen-
tury societal and political norms as compared to current societal and
political norms is revealing.61 An inquiry into the effects of culture and
class in the Shakespeare case is illuminating as to similar effects in legal
disputes. Recognition of the significance of context raises questions
about how and whether to address value-laden issues in any given case
and what to do when conflicts between values are apparent.6 2 These are
just a few examples of ways in which Shakespearian scholarship, as al-
ready encapsulated in briefs and oral argument, might work its way into
a Clinic classroom. Once Shakespeare became the focal point of a class,
it was more difficult to curtail the ideas for incorporating the theme
than it was to come up with ways in which to make Shakespeare relevant
to the practice of law. In fact, in the end, Shakespeare dominated two
classes.
V. THE ULTIMATE CHOICES
Shakespeare originally made his appearance in the appellate semi-
nar of a year-long clinical course.63 By this time, most students in the
appellate clinic had made an argument before a real court, and all of
them had filed at least one brief of their own composition. Classroom
coverage in the first semester included system analysis, interviewing, fact
writing, and theory development. The beginning of the second semes-
ter introduced the students to counseling and to different aspects of
written and oral persuasion, including logic and rhetoric, dramatic per-
60. These are issues that frequently arise in the cases clinic students handle. A student
may feel very differently about what role to assume in a divorce case in which the issue is
jurisdiction than about what the proper role is in the representation of a guilty murderer
whose speedy trial claim, if successful, will result in the client's release from prison.
61. As Shakespeare wrote, "men may construe things after their fashion,/Clean from
the purpose of the things themselves." W. SHAKESPEARE,JiUS Caesar, act 1, sc. 3, lines 31-
32. Professor Jaszi examines some of the ways in which Shakespeare's works have been
interpreted at different points in history and by different peopleJaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote
"Shakespeare"?, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 617 (1988). In his essay, Professor Boyle looks at "the
strange subtext that lies under the Shakespeare story and [links] it to current philosophical
and literary concerns about the reading of texts." Boyle, supra note 56, at 626. Professor
Boyle analogizes the desire to understand Shakespeare's writings by reference to the
"real" author to the drive to determine the "intent of the framers" in constitutional analy-
sis. Among other things, he concludes that still prevailing 18th Century romantic notions
about authors are what have led critics to reject Shakespeare of Stratford, who does not fit
the romantic conception, as author of Shakespeare's plays.
For additional reading on the subject of the relationship between social, political and
cultural norms and decision making, see R. BENDIX, CLASS, STATUS AND POWER: A READER
IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (R. Bendix & S. M. Lipset eds.
1966).
62. See supra, notes 22, 24, 28.
63. In addition to using these two classes in a clinical setting, I have included varia-
tions of them in a one-semester, non-clinical seminar on appellate advocacy.
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formance, and communication problems. The classes I am about to de-
scribe were docketed as classes on the art of responding.
In the first of these two classes, the primary emphasis is on skills.
The skills I seek to focus on are recognition of crucial points of argu-
ment, fluff elimination, argument reduction, and labeling. The primary
focal points of the second class are interpersonal relations, role assump-
tions and underlying values. In both classes I make use of some inter-
disciplinary theories that have surfaced in prior classes. In addition, an
attempt is made to bring in substantive law on the appropriate use of
reply briefs and practical advice on maximizing the effectiveness of
responses.
Prior to the first class, students are required to read the statement
of facts and summary of argument from Appellant Edward deVere's
brief. They are told to reduce deVere's argument to 50 words or less.
They are then given Appellee William Shakespeare's summary of argu-
ment and instructed to reduce it to 50 words or less.64
In class, samples of the reduced appellant's arguments are distrib-
uted and the discussion is focused on the decisions different people have
made with respect to emphasis, in particular on the process by which
choices were made and the difficulties encountered in trying to reduce a
lengthy argument to bite-size pieces. The goal is to identify the skill of
"argument reduction" and provide some information about the process
and about possible resolutions of problems associated with it. We also
talk about why this skill is important in the context of appellate
advocacy.
The second segment of the class is devoted to a variation on the
children's game of "telephone." Two students are provided with a one-
page essay or argument of some sort. I have used several different
things for this exercise, but my current favorite is a short portrayal of the
life of Shakespeare's imaginary sister by Virginia Woolf.6 5 The two stu-
dents are asked to read the essay and then they are paired up with two
other students. The readers have three minutes - or up to five minutes,
depending on the length and complexity of the essay - to relay to their
partners all the essential information contained in the essay. The two
listeners are then paired up with two other students and instructed to
convey what they have just heard. They have a reduced amount of time
in which to do this, perhaps two or three minutes. The process contin-
ues, with the last two students receiving all essential information in a
period of about thirty seconds. These last two students then relate to
the group as a whole the substance of what they have heard. The results
of the two lines of communication are invariably different.
What follows is a deconstruction of the process. How did the stu-
64. "Brevity is the soul of wit." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 2, sc. 2, line 90.
65. V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 8-50 (1929). Woolf poses the hypothetical of
William's "sister," Judith, a woman whose literary genius is equal to that of her brother's,
attempting to find an outlet for that genius. Woolf concludes that had such a person lived,
she may well have ended up committing suicide.
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dents choose what to tell? How did they decide what to eliminate? Did
they use any shortcuts-words, labels or themes-that got picked up by
the next listener and passed on? Flowing from this is a discussion about
the problem of time in the court room. Because time is scarce, and be-
cause an opponent's argument can take unexpected turns, it is impor-
tant to be able to sift through a lot of information quickly and eliminate
the non-essential. Of course, what constitutes "essential" information
and what constitutes "fluff" are questions that provoke a fair amount of
debate.
To build on the concept of labeling or themes-and the use of short-
cuts-the students are given a list of quotes from Shakespeare and asked
which they find best describe the Appellant's position, the Appellee's
position, or maybe the class. The following selected quotations are
illustrative:
"Things without all remedy
Should be without regard; what's done is done."
'66
"Good wombs have borne bad sons."
'67
"Thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."
6 8
"Reputation is an idle and most false imposition;
oft got without merit and lost without deserving.
'
"69
"[T]hy head is as full of quarrels as an egg
is full of meat."
70
"Our doubts are traitors.
'7 1
"Have we eaten on the insane root,
That takes the reason prisoner?"
7 2
"I shall the effect of this good lesson keep.""
The students' choices are compared and the question is posed whether
any of the ideas expressed in the quotations could be used as a centraliz-
ing theme for an argument. Ideas about the benefits of themetizing or
labeling get aired and ways of putting such notions into practice are dis-
cussed, often with reference to the students' own cases.
Each of these exercises stresses the importance of identifying the
heart of an argument. The first highlights the desirability of brevity; the
second, the situational necessity for speed; the third, the advantages of
having an easily remembered central theme. The final segment of the
class is devoted to conceptualization of a framework for responding that
can aid in preparation of rebuttal arguments.
It is not uncommon for a student to believe that a rebuttal argu-
ment is primarily a matter of making spontaneous declarations. The last
66. W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act 3, sc. 2, lines 11-12.
67. W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 1, sc. 2, line 22.
68. W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 3, sc. 3, lines 84-85.
69. W. SHAKESPEARE, Othello, act 2, sc. 3, lines 263-65.
70. W. SHAKESPEARE, Romeo and Juliet, act 3, sc. 1, line 22.
71. W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act 1, sc. 4, line 79.
72. W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act 1, sc. 3, lines 85-86.
73. W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 1, sc. 3, line 45.
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part of class is thus dedicated to analyzing the accuracy of this proposi-
tion and attempting to demonstrate that spontaneity can spring from a
well-ordered framework-indeed, often works best when that framework
is solidly in place in advance.
At this point, the students look at some of the 50 word reductions of
the Appellee's argument and begin to categorize them. Generally, this
categorization process breaks the possible arguments down to some-
thing like this: (1) The premises are false, incomplete or unsupported;
(2) What the party is trying to achieve (the goal) is undesirable, creates
havoc or is inconsistent with other desirable ends; (3) The points made
lack relevancy or consistency, or the inferential leap between facts and
conclusions is too great; (4) The writer is stupid, insincere, insensitive,
etc.
These four categories all focus on the opponent's position. Other
argument reductions usually fall within a set of categories building on
the strength of the appellee's position, most frequently either: (1) there
is direct support for the Appellee's position, or (2) there is indirect (con-
sistent) authority supporting the appellee's position.
Once the arguments are categorized, it becomes clear that the cate-
gories cover a great many of the arguments that could be made by a
respondent. Mastery of the categories, therefore, makes preparation for
any rebuttal an easier task. Although the strengths and weaknesses of
any given approach still must be balanced, rebuttal need no longer be
viewed as a "gut reaction," but can be seen as a measured response.
The second class brings in the human dimension. Prior to class, the
students engage in non-legal role plays with partners and write-up their
reactions to the experience. The role plays are designed to require the
students to confront persons having some measure of power or author-
ity. So, for example, one situation might involve a street encounter with
a police officer; another will place the student in a tax assessor's office.
Other students might be required to confront the principal at a daugh-
ter's school, or a nurse at a hospital. These role plays become the focus
of a discussion midway through the class.
Class begins with a review of taped excerpts of the appellant's argu-
ment in the Shakespeare case. A brief discussion follows on the differ-
ence between the appellant's written argument and his oral
presentation. The students then put into practice what they learned the
previous week. They discuss what has been identified by the appellant's
counsel as crucial and what points of argument have been eliminated.
The question of whether the argument as presented has a logo or cen-
tral theme is raised, and the students are asked to develop memorable
themes from what they have seen and heard on the tape. The themes
that get developed may run the gamut from the simple "the facts don't
fit" to the accusatory "their's is a classist plot" to the more mystical
"Shakespeare is a figment of the collective imagination." What is im-
portant about this exercise is that students are able to see that they are
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quite adept at breaking down an argument and reframing it in simple,
memorable terms.
At this point, the students are broken into groups and asked to take
a few minutes to construct a responsive argument. Volunteers from
each group are then asked to stand up and make the responsive argu-
ment before me as judge. Following the first group's presentation, the
class discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the choices made.
Alternative choices might be brought up and the advantages and disad-
vantages of these other options discussed.
The second and third arguments are then heard without any inter-
vening discussion. The second advocate's argument is interrupted by
inappropriate, irrelevant, or confusing questions and comments from
thejudge. The third volunteer faces ajudge who stares without making
any response at all. At the end of the oral presentations, the students
are asked what is different about the last two arguments, and the discus-
sion shifts from a focus on the decisions about content of the arguments
to the effects of the listener's conduct on both the substance of the argu-
ments and the speaker's ability to present arguments.
This is the time at which the role play assignments are brought into
focus. We talk about the difference between perceiving oral argument
as a performance, as many students initially assume it is, and perceiving
it as a confrontation with authority, which is what many really believe.
Students begin to reassess their assumptions about the nature of court-
room presentations and begin to think about how they deal with persons
with apparent power or authority (police officers, car mechanics, and
administrators) and what about their manner of dealing with such
figures is likely to carry over to the courtroom and cause problems.
This discussion is followed by a review of taped segments of the
responsive arguments actually made in the Shakespeare case. The ap-
pellee's choices are compared to and contrasted with the choices made
by the students. Also at this point, questions are raised about different
styles of argument-manipulation versus conciliation, for example-and
how these styles may be influenced by the attorneys' views of the nature
of oral argument and any underlying authority issues. If there is time,
volunteers are permitted to rebut the appellee's arguments and then ex-
cerpts of the rebuttal made by Professor Jaszi before the Justices are
shown.
These two classes are, I believe, rather moderate examples of the
principle that lawyering skills can be taught from any topical base. The
inspiration of Mr. Kreeger to have a debate on the origins of Shake-
speare's works and to have it presented as an appellate argument mini-
mized the amount of imaginative work it took to bring Shakespeare into
the classroom. Perhaps for that reason, it seemed an opportunity not to
be passed up. In some ways, because the groundwork for introducing
Shakespeare into a clinic seminar was already done, the classes built
from that groundwork may not be the best choices for testing or demon-
strating the hypothesis. In another way, I think the debate makes it eas-
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ier to see the association between things non-legal and legal, and thus
makes the point clearer. Even without the good fortune of having the
briefs and arguments at hand, it is possible to draw on Shakespearian
scholarship, or anything else, to make law classes both interesting and
instructive. Obviously, a law teacher could fashion a debate on the ori-
gins of Shakespeare's works without the fanfare attached to Mr.
Kreeger's spectacle and derive from that debate the same lessons as can
be derived from the jazzed-up version.
Despite the fact that the two classes described here are what I view
to be rather moderate extensions of fairly typical seminar classroom
scenes, I feel it advisable to anticipate and respond to criticisms. I hear
voices saying that the attempt to teach lawyering skills by drawing on
outside interests is inefficient, clouds the issues, and trivializes the role
lawyers must assume. There are those who would say that the best way
to learn is to do, and "doing" means doing the thing itself, or the closest
thing to it, and not some facsimile of tortuous relevance.
If the premise of such criticisms is that "person as lawyer" is some-
how fundamentally different from "person as person," then I find myself
in disagreement with the premise. It is only when we see our lawyer
selves as independent of our non-lawyer selves that we see what we do in
one context as separate from what we do in another. This notion of
separate selves has, I think, been resoundingly refuted.74 To the extent
that it still curries favor within the profession, it seems to me to be wise
to make attempts to eradicate its influence. Thus, the role of the lawyer
is trivialized in non-legal contexts only if there is a preconceived notion
of the lawyer's role.
The method is inefficient only if efficiency is defined in terms of
what students learn in the immediate environs of the classroom, what
they can regurgitate outside the classroom, or the amount of prepara-
tion time required of the teacher. It is not inefficient if looked at from
the perspective of learning yielded per class. Admittedly, a lot of prepa-
ration goes into these classes, but the long term benefits go far beyond
producing student lawyers who are capable of not humiliating them-
selves in court.
Similarly, the method clouds the issues only if the "issues" are arti-
ficially limited to well delineated legal issues. In fact, the introduction of
non-legal subjects into the classroom helps identify and clarify impor-
tant issues in the legal realm that might otherwise remain clouded. For
example, when students read and transmit the essential thoughts in Vir-
ginia Woolf's essay about Shakespeare's sister, they learn not only about
the skill of argument reduction, but about historical sexism and how in-
dividual values dictate decisions. It is a little bit like the poetry of Rob-
ert Frost or Emily Dickinson; everyday occurrences and familiar objects
74. "Our tendancy to treat the law as a separate, unique human activity has been
harmful; we need to tie law into the whole social fabric." Bergman, Sherr & Burridge, supra
note 43, at 540 (footnotes omitted). I would add that we need to tie person-as-lawyer into
the concept of the whole person.
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are the means by which the student is safely and uncombattingly
brought into other contexts.7 5 New ideas sink into consciousness with-
out the learner even necessarily realizing that the process is occurring or
knowing to what to attribute changes in thinking patterns and attitudes.
It is learning by osmosis.
CONCLUSION
Experimentation in law teaching methodologies has opened up the
range of options for those engaged in law teaching. The resulting
proliferation of possible subject areas is forcing legal educators to look
closely at their curricular offerings. It is also forcing educators to make
difficult decisions both about what is most essential substantively and
about what is the best and most efficient way to transfer knowledge and
to prepare students to utilize their knowledge, skills, and perceptions in
the practice of law. To the already overbrimming pot of subject matter
covered in the classroom, I propose to add non-legal subject areas.
Rather than flood the classroom with trivial or irrelevant ideas, I believe
the introduction of non-legal subject areas into class helps to bridge the
gap between students' life experiences and their legal careers. The in-
tegration of the non-legal with the legal enables students-and teach-
ers-to see connections between different aspects of their lives,
discloses new perspectives and meanings, clarifies and simplifies the
mysteries of law practice through the device of analogy, and provides a
measure of entertainment that enhances living as well as learning.
75. Like "Lovers and madmen," they "apprehend/More than cool reason ever com-
prehends." W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 4, sc. 1, lines 4-6.
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